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Florida’s	popular	McKay	Scholarships	for	Students	
with	Disabilities	Program	seeks	to	tilt	the	balance	in	
these	students’	favor.	The	program	provides	parents	
with	an	alternative	to	expensive	legal	proceedings	and	
complicated	bureaucracy—a	voucher	that	they	can	use	
at	a	public	or	private	school	of	their	choice.	Florida’s	
legislature	approved	the	program	in	1999	and	named	it	
after	a	then-state	senator,	John	McKay,	who	is	also	the	
father	of	a	special-needs	child.
Today,	about	17,900	of	Florida’s	estimated	402,000	
students	with	disabilities,	or	a	little	more	than	4	percent,	
receive	McKay	vouchers.1	They	attend	802	private	schools	
at	a	total	cost	of	nearly	$108	million.	That’s	up	from	just	
under	1,000	students,	100	private	schools,	and	$6	million	in	
costs	during	the	program’s	2000–01	debut	as	a	statewide	
initiative.2	The	program	is	now	the	nation’s	second	largest	
private	school	voucher	initiative	of	any	sort	in	terms	of	
student	participation,	ranking	only	behind	Milwaukee’s	17-
year-old	school	experiment	with	vouchers	for	low-income	
youngsters.3	And	school	choice	advocates	promote	the	
McKay	program	as	a	model	for	other	states	and	the	federal	
government.4	Arizona,	Ohio,	Utah,	and,	most	recently,	
Georgia	have	all	passed	similar	legislation.	Currently,	six	
other	states	are	weighing	whether	to	follow	suit.5
But	despite	its	growing	popularity,	the	McKay	program	
has	not	yet	proven	that	it	works	as	either	an	adequate	
school-choice	or	special-education	reform	measure.	
Unlike	with	Florida’s	other	school	choice	options,	the	state	
collects	very	little	information	from	schools	and	students	
participating	in	the	McKay	program.	McKay	students	
do	not	have	to	take	the	annual	state	tests	administered	
to	public	school	students,	and	McKay	schools	are	not	
required	to	report	any	information	on	student	outcomes—
which	goes	against	the	national	trend	toward	standards	
and	accountability	in	public	education.	Thus,	it	is	virtually	
impossible	to	say	whether	special-needs	children	using	
McKay	vouchers	to	attend	private	schools	are	faring	
better,	worse,	or	about	the	same	as	they	had	in	their	old	
public	schools.	It	is	also	difficult	to	determine	whether	the	
McKay	program	is	improving	existing	special-education	
services,	since,	unlike	public	schools,	McKay	schools	are	
not	required	to	provide	these	services	at	all.
Expanding	school	options	for	all	students,	those	with	
disabilities	and	those	without,	is	a	worthy	objective.	
But	McKay’s	lack	of	accountability	requirements	and	its	
minimal	quality	and	service	expectations	make	McKay	
a	seriously	flawed	program.	Under	the	current	structure	
of	the	program,	taxpayers	have	almost	no	knowledge	of	
how	their	money	is	being	spent,	and	neither	taxpayers	
nor	parents	have	access	to	solid	information	about	the	
performance	of	different	McKay	schools.	For	parents,	
the	stakes	are	very	high,	as	they	are	required	to	give	up	
their	due	process	rights	under	IDEA	if	they	choose	to	
participate	in	the	McKay	program.	Parents,	taxpayers,	and	
the	state’s	special-needs	children	deserve	better.
How McKay Works
School	choice	supporters	widely	regard	Florida	as	
a	leader	in	the	field.	It	has	a	Corporate	Tax	Credit	
Scholarship	Program	for	businesses	that	donate	to	
privately	operated	voucher	programs	and	the	second-
highest	number	of	students	in	charter	schools	among	
the	states.	Its	students	can	take	a	variety	of	courses	
through	the	state-run	Florida	Virtual	School,	and	it	has	
aggressively	implemented	the	federal	No	Child	Left	
Behind	Act’s	public	school	choice	and	supplemental	
services	programs	for	students	in	low-performing	public	
Students with disabilities have long had the right, under the federal 
Individuals with disabilities education act (Idea), to attend private 
schools at public expense if the public schools in their community are 
unable to provide them with appropriate special educational services. 
But less than 1 percent of students with disabilities have such private 
placements, in part because these placements can be costly, complicated, 
and time-consuming to obtain under the existing law.
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schools.	And	until	a	2006	state	Supreme	Court	ruling	
struck	it	down,	Florida’s	Opportunity	Scholarship	Program	
offered	private	school	vouchers	to	students	whose	public	
schools	chronically	failed	to	meet	state	standards.6	
Hence,	the	McKay	program	is	part	of	an	extensive	
portfolio	of	school	choice	options	that	the	state	has	built	
over	the	past	decade.
The	McKay	program	began	in	1999	as	a	one-county	pilot	
program.	A	small	part	of	then-Gov.	Jeb	Bush’s	“A+	Plan	
for	Education,”	which	included	a	new	statewide	school	
accountability	system	and	the	now-defunct	Opportunity	
Scholarships,	the	McKay	program	attracted	little	of	the	
attention	or	political	opposition	voucher	initiatives	usually	
draw.	The	program’s	namesake,	John	McKay,	argued	
that	the	IDEA	process	for	obtaining	private	placements	
primarily	benefited	children	whose	affluent	parents	
knew	how	to	work	the	bureaucracy,	leaving	those	with	
less-savvy	parents	behind.	“We	were	doing	a	great	job	
of	empowering	the	powerful,”	he	said.	“My	question	
was,	‘what	about	the	rest	of	the	parents?’	This	[McKay]	
program	is	for	them.”	In	early	2000,	McKay,	with	little	
difficulty,	persuaded	fellow	lawmakers	to	take	the	program	
statewide	beginning	that	fall.7
To	be	eligible	for	a	McKay	voucher,	students	must	be	
identified	by	their	school	district	as	having	a	disability	
and	have	an	Individual	Education	Plan	(IEP),	a	document	
required	by	federal	law	that	spells	out	a	child’s	needs.	
They	must	also	have	attended	a	Florida	public	school	
for	at	least	a	year.	If	their	child	is	eligible,	parents	only	
need	to	file	a	non-binding	declaration	of	intent	with	the	
Florida	Department	of	Education	and	enroll	their	child	in	a	
participating	private	school	in	order	to	receive	a	voucher.	
The	school	takes	care	of	the	rest	of	the	paperwork.	The	
Florida	Department	of	Education	sends	voucher	checks	
directly	to	the	schools	in	four	installments	throughout	the	
school	year.	The	checks	are	made	out	to	parents,	who	then	
sign	them	over	to	the	schools.	Private	schools	in	the	McKay	
program	set	their	own	tuition,	and	if	it	is	greater	than	the	
amount	of	the	voucher,	parents	must	cover	the	difference.
Unlike	many	voucher	programs,	which	offer	the	same	
voucher	amount	to	all	participating	students,	the	value	of	
McKay	vouchers	varies	depending	on	a	child’s	disability.	In	
Florida,	school	districts	receive	special-education	funding	
on	a	per-pupil	basis.	Each	child	is	assigned	one	of	five	
funding	levels,	known	as	a	“matrix	of	services,”	depending	
on	the	child’s	age	and	the	intensity	of	special-education	
services	he	or	she	receives.8	This	determines	how	much	
money	a	school	district	receives	to	educate	that	child;	for	
children	participating	in	the	McKay	program,	that	funding	
level	becomes	the	amount	of	their	vouchers.	In	the	2005–06	
school	year,	McKay	voucher	amounts	ranged	from	$4,805	
to	$20,708.	Fifty-five	percent	of	students	are	in	the	lowest	
matrix	of	services	and	receive	the	smallest	voucher	amount;	
an	additional	39	percent	are	in	the	next	two	matrix	levels	
and	receive	a	similar	amount	of	funding	as	the	first	level.9
Lack of Accountability
As	the	nation’s	second-largest	voucher	program,	
McKay	has	the	potential	to	be	a	valuable	resource	for	
policymakers	and	educators	interested	in	the	likely	
impacts	of	expanding	private	school	vouchers	or	other	
forms	of	school	choice.	Thus,	it	is	important	to	ask	how	
the	program	is	functioning	as	a	school	choice	program	
and	whether	or	not	it	bears	out	promises	made	by	
voucher	advocates	and	concerns	raised	by	voucher	
critics.	These	questions	are	essential	to	assessing	
the	influence	of	the	program,	but	also	are	important	
for	legislators	to	think	about	as	they	consider	similar	
programs	in	other	states.
But	many	of	the	most	important	policy	questions	about	
McKay—in	particular,	what	influence	it	has	on	student	
achievement—are	virtually	impossible	to	answer,	because	
the	state	collects	very	little	information	from	schools	
and	students	participating	in	the	program.	Students	
attending	charter	or	magnet	schools	must	take	the	
same	state	assessments	that	are	used	to	measure	
student	performance	and	hold	schools	accountable	
within	the	public	school	system,	while	students	receiving	
corporate	tax	credit	vouchers	must	take	a	nationally	
norm-referenced	test	approved	by	the	state.	But	McKay	
students	are	not	required	to	take	such	assessments,	and,	
as	a	result,	we	cannot	know	whether	McKay	students	
perform	better,	worse,	or	the	same	as	special	education	
students	in	public	schools.
Questions	about	the	quality	of	special-education	services	
offered	by	the	McKay	program	are	also	difficult	to	
answer,	because	there	is	no	requirement	that	schools	
participating	in	the	McKay	program	provide	such	services.	
Essentially,	all	a	private	school	has	to	do	to	receive	McKay	
vouchers	is	to	sign	up.	Schools	participating	in	the	McKay	
program	do	not	have	to	be	accredited.	The	law	requires	
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private	schools	participating	in	McKay	to	“demonstrate	
financial	stability,”	but	the	evidence	required	for	such	
demonstration	is	very	weak—a	school	can	meet	the	
standard	simply	by	having	been	open	for	one	full	year.	
Starting	this	year,	schools	in	the	McKay	program	must	
also	conduct	employee	background	checks	and	make	
student	files	available	to	auditors.	But	they	do	not	have	to	
provide	any	evidence	of	the	quality	of	their	programs	or	
student	achievement.
The	lack	of	information	on	student	outcomes	and	the	
absence	of	quality-control	requirements	are	significant	
flaws	in	the	McKay	program,	because	they	undermine	
both	public	accountability	for	public	education	funds	and	
parents’	ability	to	make	informed	decisions	about	their	
children’s	education.
When	schools	receive	public	funds	to	educate	students,	
as	they	do	in	the	McKay	program,	the	taxpayers	who	
foot	the	bill	have	an	interest	in	ensuring	that	the	schools	
are	educating	students	effectively	and	serving	public	
aims.	But	without	any	public	accountability	for	student	
performance,	taxpayers	have	no	evidence	that	their	
money	is	not	being	wasted.
Others	have	recognized	McKay’s	flaws.	An	editorial	in	
Florida’s	St. Petersburg Times,	published	in	2002,	noted	
that:
“No	one	really	knows	how	well	the	…	McKay	
program	is	working	because	those	who	
oversee	it	are	covering	their	eyes.	…	Ask	
how	these	private	schools	are	performing	or	
whether	students	and	families	are	happy,	or	
even	whether	tax	dollars	are	being	used	in	
accordance	with	state	law,	and	the	response	
tends	to	follow	two	paths:	1)	We	trust	parents	
to	make	smart	decisions	for	their	students,	or,	
2)	We	don’t	know.”10
And	in	a	2003	paper	for	the	centrist	Progressive	Policy	
Institute,	Andrew	Rotherham	and	Sara	Mead	argued	that	
Table 1. demographic Characteristics of McKay Voucher Students 
Race/Ethnicity McKay Students
All Florida Special 
Education Students All Florida Students
White 49% 49% 48%
Black 29% 27% 23%
Hispanic 19% 20% 23%
All	Other 	 3% 	 4% 	 6%
Disability Diagnosis
Specific	Learning	Disabled 39% 45%
Speech	Impaired 	 7% 14%
Language	Impaired 	 8% 	 9%
Emotionally	Handicapped 	 7% 	 7%
Educable	Mentally	Handicapped 	 7% 	 7%
Other	Health	Impaired* 10% 	 4%
Autistic 	 3% 	 2%
All	Other** 19% 11%
*“Other	Health	Impaired”	includes	students	with	Attention	Deficit	Disorder	(ADD),	Attention	Deficit	Hyperactivity	Disorder	(ADHD),	and	health	
conditions,	such	as	asthma,	that	interfere	with	their	education	and	require	accommodations.
**Total	of	the	following	low-incidence	diagnoses:	Trainable	Mentally	Handicapped,	Orthopedically	Impaired,	Deaf/Hard	of	Hearing,	Visually	Impaired,	
Hospital/Homebound,	Profoundly	Mentally	Handicapped,	Dual	Sensory	Impaired,	Severely	Emotionally	Disturbed,	Traumatic	Brain	Injured,	
Developmentally	Delayed,	Established	Conditions.
Source:	Florida	Department	of	Education,	John M. McKay Scholarship Program February Quarterly Report,	March	2007,	available	online	at	http://www.
floridaschoolchoice.org/Information/McKay/quarterly_reports/mckay_report_feb2007.pdf;	compare	to	Florida	Department	of	Education,	Profiles of 
Florida Public School Districts, 2005–06,	May	2007,	available	online	at	http://www.fldoe.org/eias/eiaspubs/pdf/ssdata06.pdf.
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the	program’s	“vague”	definition	of	accountability	was	
“at	odds	with	principles	of	NCLB,	IDEA,	and	most	state	
accountability	systems.”	Rotherham	and	Mead	point	to	
the	President’s	Commission	on	Excellence	in	Special	
Education’s	language	emphasizing	the	importance	
of	accountability:	“IDEA	should	allow	state	use	of	
federal	special	education	funds	to	enable	students	with	
disabilities	to	attend	schools	or	to	access	services	of	their	
family’s	choosing,	provided states measure and report 
outcomes for all students benefiting from IDEA funds”	
(emphasis	added).	The	paper’s	authors	conclude:	“This	
is	something	that	both	the	McKay	program	and	special	
education	voucher	proposals	in	Congress	assuredly	do	
not	do.”11
Still,	McKay	supporters	argue	that	stronger	public	
accountability	is	unnecessary	because	schools	
participating	in	the	McKay	program	are	accountable	to	
parents,	who	can	withdraw	their	children	from	the	school	
if	they	are	unsatisfied	with	the	services	they	receive.	
Parents,	the	argument	goes,	are	the	best	judges	of	
whether	or	not	a	school	is	serving	their	children	well.
But	research	suggests	that	the	lack	of	publicly	available	
information	about	school	performance	undermines	
parents’	ability	to	make	good	choices.	A	2005	survey	
of	parents	in	Duval	County,	Fla.,	found	that	significant	
numbers	of	parents	of	special	education	students—
including	50	percent	of	those	who	ultimately	chose	to	
remain	in	the	public	schools	and	13	percent	of	those	
in	the	McKay	program—felt	they	were	unable	to	get	as	
much	information	as	they	wanted	to	choose	a	school	
for	their	child.	More	than	a	quarter	of	parents	of	special-
needs	students	had	not	even	heard	of	the	McKay	
program.	Several	public	school	parents	noted	that	lack	of	
information	about	available	private	schools	was	the	main	
reason	they	chose	to	keep	their	children	in	public	school.12
School	choice	works	best	when	parents	have	access	
to	accurate,	comparable	information	that	allows	
them	to	comparison	shop	among	available	school	
options,	taking	into	account	their	educational	offerings,	
student	performance,	staff	qualifications,	and	other	
characteristics.	But	even	then,	parents	sometimes	
insist	on	choosing	poor	quality	schools.	For	instance,	
low-performing	charter	schools,	such	as	the	John	
A.	Reisenbach	charter	school	in	New	York	City	and	
SouthEast	Academy	in	Washington,	D.C.,	have	remained	
popular	with	parents,	who	actually	protested	efforts	
to	close	these	schools	based	on	poor	academic	
performance.	This	suggests	that	accountability	to	parents	
alone	is	insufficient	to	protect	the	public	interest	or	ensure	
taxpayer	money	is	used	well.13
Some	advocates	of	the	McKay	program	argue	that	
more	robust	public	accountability	measures	would	be	
inappropriate	because	the	program	serves	students	with	
disabilities.	Certain	disabilities	can	make	it	more	difficult	
to	accurately	assess	what	students	know	and	can	do,	
and	standard	state	assessments	are	inappropriate	for	
students	with	the	most	severe	educational	needs.	But	
most	students	in	the	McKay	program	have	relatively	
minor	disabilities,	such	as	specific	learning	disabilities,	
and	should	be	able	to	pass	state	assessments	if	given	
appropriate	instruction	and	testing	accommodations.	
NCLB	actually	requires	Florida	and	other	states	to	develop	
modified	and/or	alternate	assessments	to	measure	the	
progress	of	students	who	cannot	take	the	regular	state	
exam.
For	decades,	parents	of	and	advocates	for	students	with	
special	needs	have	been	fighting	to	ensure	that	schools	
are	held	accountable	to	educate	their	students	and	that	
children	with	special	needs	are	included	in	state	education	
accountability	systems.	The	lack	of	accountability	in	the	
McKay	program	is	a	giant	step	backward.
Private Schools’ Response
It	is	difficult	to	reach	meaningful	conclusions	about	the	
McKay	program	as	a	school-choice	or	special-education	
reform	measure,	but	the	program	does	shed	light	on	
some	other	important	school	choice	debates,	in	particular	
questions	about	whether	or	not	private	schools	will	
serve	students	who	are	disadvantaged	or	challenging	to	
educate,	and	whether	they	will	respond	to	vouchers	by	
increasing	school	supply.
Voucher	critics	often	argue	that	vouchers	will	exacerbate	
existing	educational	inequalities	because	private	
schools	will	discriminate	against	disadvantaged	student	
populations—such	as	students	with	disabilities	and	those	
from	low-income	or	racial	and	ethnic	minority	groups—
something	public	schools	are	forbidden	to	do.
But	existing	evidence	about	the	McKay	program	usage	
does	not	bear	out	these	concerns.	The	racial	and	ethnic	
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breakdown	of	McKay	students	roughly	mirrors	the	state’s	
total	special	education	population.14	And	41	percent	
of	students	receiving	McKay	vouchers	are	eligible	for	
free	or	reduced	price	lunch,	an	indicator	of	economic	
disadvantage,	which	means	that	although	many	private	
schools	require	parents	to	pay	tuition	above	and	beyond	
the	voucher,	there	is	no	indication	that	low-income	
parents	are	prevented	from	using	the	program.15
And,	the	fact	that	some	800	Florida	private	schools—
one-third	of	those	in	the	state—are	registered	with	the	
McKay	program,	and	nearly	17,900	Florida	students	with	
disabilities	use	McKay	vouchers	to	attend	private	schools,	
demonstrates	that	some	private	schools	are	willing	to	
enroll	students	with	disabilities.
There	is	also	no	evidence	that	these	schools	are	
“skimming”	students	with	the	least	severe	disabilities.	
With	a	few	exceptions,	students	with	the	most	common	
disabilities—specific	learning	disabilities,	language,	
emotional,	and	less	severe	mental	disabilities—	are	
represented	at	similar	rates	among	both	McKay	
scholarship	recipients	and	Florida’s	total	special	education	
population.	Students	with	the	most	severe	disabilities,	for	
example	those	who	are	both	blind	and	deaf,	are	too	few	
to	compare	their	representation	in	the	McKay	and	regular	
special	education	programs,	but	autistic	students,	who	
often	need	very	intense	services,	are	actually	represented	
in	the	McKay	program	at	a	higher	rate	than	in	the	regular	
special	education	population.16	And	the	percentage	of	
McKay	students	with	the	most	intense	needs—those	
in	the	top	two	levels	of	Florida’s	five-level	“matrix	of	
services”—is	roughly	the	same	as	the	percentage	of	all	
special	education	students	in	these	two	levels.17
In	fact,	private	schools	may	be	more	willing	to	serve	
students	with	more	severe	needs	because	the	McKay	
program	provides	them	with	larger	vouchers.	But	it	is	
still	possible	that	those	private	schools	that	currently	see	
McKay	students	as	a	way	to	expand	their	market	might	be	
less	willing	to	serve	students	with	disabilities	if	vouchers	
were	made	available	to	a	broader	student	population.
Increasing Supply
Some	voucher	proponents	argue	that	increasing	parent	
choice	will	establish	a	new	education	marketplace,	
attracting	new	providers	to	open	new	schools	to	meet	
parent	demand.	There	is	some	evidence	that	Florida’s	
constellation	of	voucher	programs—McKay,	the	Corporate	
Tax	Credit	Scholarship	Program,	and	the	now-defunct	
Opportunity	Scholarships—is	having	this	result.	Between	
the	1999–2001	and	2005–06	school	years,	the	number	of	
private	schools	in	Florida	increased	more	than	8	percent,	
from	1,916	to	2,078.18
Some	of	these	schools	have	been	created	specifically	to	
serve	special	education	students	in	the	McKay	program.	
For	example,	Father	Anglim	Academy,	a	Catholic	school	
in	Fort	Myers,	opened	in	2002	with	a	specific	mission	to	
serve	students	with	disabilities.19	The	Blossom	Montessori	
School	for	the	Deaf,	in	Clearwater,	opened	in	2003	as	the	
second	school	in	the	state	to	exclusively	serve	deaf	and	
hearing	impaired	children,	and	the	first	such	school	in	the	
nation	to	use	the	Montessori	Method.20
The	McKay	program	also	has	drawn	the	attention	of	
for-profit	companies.	For	example,	in	2002	Trimaran	
Capital	Partners,	a	highly	diversified	venture	capital	firm,	
purchased	Educational	Services	of	America,	Inc.	(ESA),	
which	owned	17	Florida	private	schools	serving	students	
with	disabilities.	Trimaran	has	since	sought	to	capitalize	
on	the	profit	opportunities	created	by	McKay	and	expand	
the	number	of	its	schools	serving	McKay	students	to	
achieve	“critical	mass.”21
Not	all	of	the	new	schools	that	have	opened	are	good	
ones;	the	lack	of	transparent	information	or	public	
accountability	has	created	opportunities	for	corrupt	
school	operators	to	misuse	public	funds	while	failing	
to	educate	children.	A	2001	report	by	People	for	the	
American	Way,	a	national	liberal	public-interest	group	that	
opposes	vouchers,	offers	numerous	examples	of	financial	
mismanagement	and	abuse	by	schools	in	the	McKay	
program.22	For	example,	Art	and	Angel	Rocker,	whose	
AJC	2000	Management	Team,	Inc.	ran	six	small	church-
based	schools	created	to	take	advantage	of	McKay	and	
other	voucher	programs,	faced	numerous	allegations	
of	corruption	and	failure	to	provide	services	to	students	
before	such	complaints	drove	them	out	of	business	in	
spring	of	2002.	(Some	of	the	schools	remain	open	as	
stand-alone	schools.)23
Beyond	the	creation	of	new	schools,	anecdotal	reports	
suggest	that	some	private	schools	are	increasing	their	
special	education	offerings	to	meet	parent	demand	fueled	
by	the	McKay	program.	Catholic	schools,	in	particular,	are	
increasingly	reaching	out	to	students	with	special	needs.	
6 EDUCATION SECTOR REPORTS: Florida’s Special Ed Vouchers www.educationsector.org
“It’s	been	the	case	in	the	past	that	since	we	couldn’t	help	
those	students,	we	would	usually	recommend	another	
school,”	said	Emma	Ventura,	then-principal	at	St.	Brendan	
Elementary	School	in	Miami.	In	2005,	St.	Brendan	became	
one	of	the	first	Catholic	schools	in	the	Archdiocese	of	
Miami	to	offer	a	self-contained	elementary	school	program	
for	special	education	students.24	(About	half	of	McKay	
voucher	students	attend	religiously	affiliated	schools.)
Still,	the	McKay	option	remains	unavailable	for	many	
families.	Large	urban	counties	like	Dade,	Broward,	and	
Escambia	have	many	private	schools	participating	in	the	
McKay	program.	But	12	of	Florida’s	67	counties	have	no	
participating	private	schools,	and	14	counties	have	only	
one	participating	private	school.25
And,	while	McKay	is	expanding	the	number	of	private	
schools	serving	students	with	disabilities,	the	lack	
of	public	accountability	or	information	about	student	
achievement	makes	it	impossible	to	know	whether	or	
not	these	private	schools	serving	McKay	students	are,	
in	the	aggregate,	delivering	better	services	or	improving	
the	quality	of	educational	outcomes	for	students	with	
disabilities.
More Problems Than Solutions
In	existing	research	and	ongoing	debates,	educators	and	
policymakers	primarily	focus	on	the	McKay	program	as	
a	voucher	initiative.	But	McKay	isn’t	simply	a	voucher	
program;	it’s	also	being	marketed	as	a	solution	to	
particular	problems	in	special	education,	specifically	the	
difficulties	some	parents	face	in	getting	needed	services	
for	their	children	and	conflicts	between	school	districts	and	
parents	over	how	to	serve	children	with	special	needs.26	
But	the	available	evidence	suggests	that	McKay	is	not	
having	positive	impacts	as	a	special	education	reform	and	
may	actually	be	exacerbating	existing	problems.
The	rationale	behind	McKay	as	a	special	education	
reform	is	straightforward.	There	is	widespread	agreement	
that	children	with	disabilities	require	special	educational	
services	and	supports	customized	to	their	individual	
needs.	Under	federal	law—the	Rehabilitation	Act	of	
1973	and	IDEA—children	with	disabilities	have	a	legal	
right	to	such	services	and	school	districts	must	provide	
them.	In	rare	instances,	this	means	that	a	school	district	
that	lacks	capacity	to	meet	a	child’s	needs	must	pay	his	
or	her	tuition	at	a	special	private	school	that	can.	But	
parents	and	school	districts	often	disagree	about	exactly	
what	services	a	child	needs	or	is	entitled	to	under	law,	
and	school	districts	can	be	reluctant	to	provide	costly	
services	or	accommodations—particularly	private	special	
educational	placements.	Parents	who	are	dissatisfied	
with	how	the	district	is	serving	their	child	have	the	right	
to	appeal—such	cases	have	gone	all	the	way	to	the	
Supreme	Court—but	the	appeals	process	is	expensive,	
complex,	and	time-consuming.
McKay	supporters	argue	that	school	choice	offers	parents	
of	children	with	disabilities	a	more	efficient	and	effective	
way	to	get	the	customized	services	their	children	need	
and	that	the	option	to	transfer	to	a	private	school	could	
strengthen	parents’	hand	in	negotiating	with	school	
officials.
While	this	argument	makes	sense	in	theory,	there	is	little	
evidence	to	support	it	in	practice.	If	McKay	is	indeed	
offering	a	better	way	for	parents	to	get	needed	services	
for	their	children,	there	should	be	fewer	instances	of	
parents	challenging	school	district	decisions.	But	this	
doesn’t	seem	to	be	the	case.	During	the	2005–06	school	
year,	the	Florida	Department	of	Education	received	177	
requests	for	special	education	due	process	hearings.	
Although	this	is	less	than	the	187	such	requests	in	2000,	
the	first	year	the	McKay	program	operated	statewide,	the	
number	of	hearing	requests	has	fluctuated	over	the	last	
six	years,	and	there	is	no	consistent	downward	trend.27
Also,	in	their	2003	paper,	Rotherham	and	Mead	point	
out	that	if	the	program	actually	helped	the	parents	who	
were	the	most	dissatisfied	and	had	the	most	difficulty	
getting	services	from	their	public	schools,	private	schools	
would	be	enrolling	far	more	students	with	the	most	
severe	needs,	rather	than	serving	them	at	a	rate	roughly	
proportionate	to	their	share	of	the	total	special	education	
population,	as	is	currently	the	case.28
Program	backers	counter	that	parents	of	children	with	
milder	or	less	visible	disabilities	are	the	ones	most	likely	
to	be	unhappy	with	public	schools	because	there	is	more	
room	for	disagreement	over	the	scope	of	their	services.29	
But	all	of	this	analysis	involves	a	fair	amount	of	guesswork	
because	there	is	so	little	actual	data	about	the	McKay	
program	and	its	participating	students	and	schools.	More	
research	is	needed	to	better	understand	why	parents	
choose	McKay	over	the	IDEA	process	(and	vice	versa)	
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as	well	as	to	understand	how	school	choice	through	the	
McKay	program	compares	to	IDEA’s	due	process	as	a	
way	for	parents	to	get	needed	special-education	services.
In	the	absence	of	meaningful	student	performance	
data,	some	researchers	supportive	of	the	program	have	
used	parent	surveys	to	try	to	evaluate	its	results.	For	
example,	a	2003	report	by	researcher	Jay	P.	Greene	for	
the	conservative	Manhattan	Institute	found	that	parents	
whose	children	previously	had	used,	or	currently	were	
using,	McKay	vouchers	were	much	more	satisfied	with	
their	experiences	in	private	schools	than	they	had	been	
with	their	experiences	in	the	public	schools.30	Such	findings	
are	hardly	surprising;	parents	are	only	likely	to	opt	into	
the	McKay	program	if	they	are	already	unhappy	with	the	
services	their	children	receive	in	the	public	schools,	and	
other	researchers	have	found	that	the	mere	fact	of	making	a	
choice	increases	satisfaction	with	the	choice	that	is	made.31
While	it	is	important	to	know	why	parents	choose	McKay	
over	the	IDEA	process,	national	advocates	for	people	with	
disabilities	and	Florida	special	educators	are	concerned	
about	the	fact	that	parents	who	choose	to	participate	in	
the	McKay	program	give	up	their	due	process	rights	to	
services	under	IDEA.	Such	concerns	are	heightened	by	
the	fact	that	while	public	schools	are	required	by	law	to	
provide	disabled	students	with	an	Individual	Education	
Plan,	services	and	accommodations,	the	U.S.	Department	
of	Education	has	ruled	that	private	schools	in	the	McKay	
program	are	not	required	to	do	any	of	these	things.
But	a	clear	majority	of	parents	who	participated	in	the	
Manhattan	Institute	survey	reported	that	private	schools	
were	providing	their	children	all	the	services	required	by	
federal	law.	In	addition,	the	survey	found	that	parents	were	
perfectly	willing	to	waive	their	federal	rights	under	IDEA	
if	they	felt	their	children	would	receive	the	services	they	
would	otherwise	be	guaranteed	to	receive	under	the	law.	
The	researchers	concluded	that:	“The	ability	to	withdraw	
their	students	from	public	schools	and	place	them	in	
private	schools	has	effectively	empowered	parents	to	
ensure	a	level	of	services	for	their	children	that	IDEA	has	
often	failed	to	ensure.”32
This	finding	cannot	be	independently	verified,	however,	
because	there	is	no	aggregate,	publicly	available	
information	about	the	services	private	schools	are	
providing	to	McKay	students.	Further,	parents	who	
become	dissatisfied	with	a	private	school’s	special	
education	program	after	enrolling,	or	who	find	that	it	fails	
to	provide	promised	services,	have	little	recourse	other	
than	to	pull	their	child	out	of	the	school.
It’s	also	possible	that	the	McKay	program	could	be	
creating	perverse	incentives	for	parents	and	schools	
that	exacerbate	the	over-identification	of	students	with	
disabilities,	a	serious	problem	in	special	education.	
Offering	vouchers	to	children	with	disabilities—and	only	
children	with	disabilities—creates	an	incentive	for	parents	
to	seek	out	a	special	education	diagnosis	in	order	to	get	a	
voucher.	Anecdotal	evidence	suggests	that	some	parents	
seek	out	diagnoses	of	learning	disabilities	or	attention	
deficit	hyperactivity	disorder	(ADHD)	to	get	their	children	
additional	help	and	accommodations	on	tests.33	McKay’s	
offer	of	a	voucher	for	students	with	disabilities	creates	an	
even	stronger	incentive	for	parents	to	“game	the	system.”	
And	Florida	psychologists	who	diagnose	youngsters	
with	ADHD	and	other	disabilities	have	told	reporters	that	
they	see	some	Florida	parents	who	are	seeking	these	
diagnoses	just	so	they	can	get	a	McKay	voucher.34
Demographic	data	for	McKay	program	participants	
also	lend	some	credence	to	this	concern.	While	most	
categories	of	disabilities	are	represented	at	similar	rates	
in	McKay	and	the	state’s	total	special	education	student	
population,	the	percentage	of	McKay	students	classified	
as	“other	health	impaired,”	a	catch-all	category	that	
includes	attention	deficit	disorder	(ADD)	and	ADHD,	is	
more	than	twice	as	high	as	their	percentage	of	the	state’s	
total	special	education	population—10.3	percent	for	
McKay	versus	4.2	percent	for	the	state.35
McKay	supporters	counter	that	any	perverse	incentive	
McKay	might	create	for	parents	to	seek	out	spurious	
diagnoses	is	countered	by	the	increased	incentive	it	
creates	for	public	schools	to	deny	such	diagnoses	to	
avoid	losing	such	students—and	state	funds—to	private	
schools.	But	creating	new	incentives	for	schools	to	
avoid	diagnosing	students	with	disabilities	could	have	
very	serious	negative	impacts	for	children	who	do	have	
disabilities	and	is	also	likely	to	exacerbate	conflict	
between	parents	and	schools—the	very	conflict	McKay	
seeks	to	reduce—over	assessing	and	diagnosing	children	
for	disabilities.
At	the	same	time,	it’s	possible	public	schools	may	
actually	have	a	financial	incentive	to	push	students	with	
disabilities	into	the	McKay	program.	In	a	2003	report,	the	
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Washington,	D.C.-based	libertarian	Cato	Institute	noted	
that	although	districts	lose	state	aid	whenever	parents	use	
a	McKay	voucher	to	transfer	children	to	private	schools,	
they	retain	an	estimated	$560	in	local	revenue	whenever	
a	student	uses	a	voucher	to	depart.36	Further,	because	
school	districts	are	obligated	to	spend	whatever	it	costs	
to	provide	children	with	disabilities	the	“free,	appropriate	
education”	required	by	IDEA,	even	if	that	cost	exceeds	
the	amount	of	state	and	local	funding	they	receive	to	
educate	the	child,	districts	might	also	have	an	incentive	to	
encourage	children	whose	IEPs	require	costlier	services,	
as	well	as	those	who	are	disruptive,	to	switch	to	the	
McKay	program.
The	ultimate	measure	of	whether	McKay	is	working	as	
special	education	reform	would	be	its	ability	to	improve	
the	achievement	of	students	with	disabilities—both	those	
in	the	McKay	program	and	those	remaining	in	public	
schools.	Unfortunately,	the	lack	of	public	reporting	or	
accountability	for	students	in	the	McKay	program	makes	
it	impossible	to	know	whether	it	is	having	a	positive,	
negative,	or	no	effect	on	these	students’	learning.
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Policy Recommendations
There	are	two	primary	approaches	to	accountability	in	
education:	accountability	that	focuses	on	regulating	inputs	
and	processes,	and	accountability	focused	on	outcomes.	
The	current	IDEA,	with	its	many	regulations	and	
procedural	and	documentation	requirements	designed	
to	protect	the	rights	of	children	with	disabilities,	is	an	
example	of	the	former.	Supporters	of	special	education	
vouchers	argue	that	vouchers	are	desirable	because	
they	give	parents	an	alternative	to	cumbersome	special	
education	bureaucracy.	But	the	programs	they	support	
are	fundamentally	flawed	because	they	do	not	replace	
IDEA’s	process	and	input	accountability	with	outcomes	
accountability.	Instead,	programs	like	McKay	abandon	
public	oversight	altogether	and	cut	parents	loose	to	fend	
for	themselves.
School	choice	advocates	are	promoting	McKay	vouchers	
as	a	model	for	other	states	and	even	federal	special	
education	policy;	four	other	states—Arizona,	Ohio,	Utah,	
and	Georgia—have	adopted	McKay-like	programs,	and	
more	are	considering	doing	so.	But	the	lack	of	any	public	
accountability	in	the	program,	combined	with	the	dearth	
of	evidence	that	it	has	any	impact	in	improving	student	
outcomes	or	reducing	conflict	between	parents	and	
educators,	suggest	that	legislators	should	have	serious	
reservations	about	such	proposals.
That	does	not	mean	that	legislators	should	give	up	on	
trying	to	expand	choice	and	reduce	bureaucracy	and	
conflict	for	students	with	special	needs	and	their	families.	
But	any	program	designed	to	expand	choice	outside	the	
IDEA	process	for	students	with	special	needs	must,	at	a	
minimum,	meet	the	following	criteria:
Require private schools in the McKay program to 
administer state assessments, where appropriate, 
and publicly report the results.	Without	outcome	data	
on	student	performance,	policymakers	and	the	public	
have	no	way	to	tell	whether	educational	programs	are	
effective.	Similarly,	the	failure	to	include	schools	serving	
McKay	students	in	state	assessments	deprives	parents	
of	a	valuable	source	of	information	about	the	schools’	
and	their	own	students’	performance.	Most	students	
in	the	McKay	program	should	be	able	to	take	Florida’s	
standardized	state	assessment.	There	is	a	small	minority	
of	students	with	special	needs	for	whom	such	tests	are	
truly	inappropriate,	but	NCLB	requires	states	to	develop	
alternative	and/or	modified	assessments	for	these	
students.	Private	schools	in	the	McKay	program	could	use	
those	assessments	for	students	with	severe	disabilities,	or	
they	could	develop	their	own.
Provide transparent information about schools to 
parents and the public.	Choosing	a	school	is	difficult	for	
any	parent,	but	it	is	particularly	challenging	when	a	child	
has	special	needs.	Currently,	however,	parents	interested	
in	the	McKay	program	are	largely	on	their	own	in	finding	
information	about	participating	schools,	the	services	they	
provide,	the	quality	of	their	staffs,	and	their	performance.	
States	adopting	McKay-like	programs	should	develop	a	
statewide	database	of	participating	private	schools	that	
includes	uniform,	accurate,	and	reliable	information	about	
test	scores,	services	offered,	staff	qualifications	and	other	
school	features	important	to	parents.	Such	a	database	
could	be	administered	by	the	state	or	privately	by	an	
association	or	cooperative	of	participating	private	schools.	
While	private	schools	might	initially	resist	requirements	
to	submit	information	to	such	a	database,	in	the	long-run	
it	could	help	them	by	making	it	easier	for	parents	to	find	
information	about	school	options	and	pick	the	right	school.
Create an ombudsman for parent complaints.	When	
parents	choose	to	use	a	McKay	voucher	to	send	their	
child	to	a	private	school,	they	surrender	their	due	process	
and	other	rights	under	IDEA.	If	the	school	fails	to	deliver	
promised	services,	they	have	no	recourse	other	than	to	
withdraw	their	child	from	the	school.	It	is	inappropriate	
to	subject	private	schools	to	IDEA	due	process	and	
unnecessary	because	parents	may	choose	to	withdraw	
their	child.	But	one	of	the	benefits	of	IDEA’s	due	process	
provisions	is	that	it	gives	parents	recourse	in	dealing	with	
schools	that	chronically	fail	or	refuse	to	serve	students	
with	disabilities	and	gives	school	districts	a	strong	
disincentive	for	such	behavior.	In	the	absence	of	due	
process,	some	alternative	is	needed	to	protect	taxpayer	
and	public	interests	from	misbehaving	schools.	States	
that	create	McKay-like	programs	should	also	establish	an	
ombudsman	to	whom	parents	can	bring	complaints	about	
school	malfeasance	or	misrepresentation	of	services.	This	
ombudsman	could	also	protect	public	funds	by	receiving	
complaints	from	parents,	staff,	and	other	concerned	
individuals	about	school	financial	irregularities,	which	have	
been	a	problem	in	some	McKay	schools.
Don’t tolerate schools that fail to serve students.	In	
general,	parents	and	children	are	the	primary	beneficiaries	
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of	education	funds	and	are	therefore	the	most	invested	in	
the	choices	they	make.	But	because	taxpayers	are	footing	
the	bill,	they	also	have	an	interest	in	ensuring	schools	
that	receive	public	funds	are	effective	and	do	what	they	
are	supposed	to	do.	Further,	there	is	a	public	obligation	
to	protect	parents—before	they	enroll	their	child	in	a	
school—from	school	operators	who	would	mislead	them	
about	services	and	fail	to	serve	their	children.	Therefore,	
schools	that	chronically	fail	to	participate	in	assessments,	
have	poor	student	outcomes,	or	receive	multiple	
substantiated	parent	complaints	should	lose	their	ability	to	
receive	public	funds	under	McKay	and	similar	programs.
Ensure that students with disabilities have access to 
public school choice in a variety of forms.	Children	
with	special	needs	can	benefit	from	increased	choice	
and	customization	in	education,	but	vouchers	are	hardly	
the	only	way	to	expand	choice.	Magnet	schools,	charter	
schools,	and	open	enrollment	all	offer	choice	within	the	
public	school	system,	and	more	children	currently	attend	
schools	of	choice	through	these	means	than	are	enrolled	
in	private	schools.	But	children	with	disabilities	often	have	
difficulty	accessing	these	choices.	Policymakers	should	
work	to	ensure	that	students	with	special	needs	have	ample	
access	to	school	choice	within	the	public	school	system,	by	
improving	funding	transferability	for	students	with	special	
needs,	eliminating	policies	that	allow	magnet	schools	to	
pick	and	choose	their	students	in	ways	that	exclude	these	
youngsters,	holding	charter	schools	accountable	to	serve	
students	with	special	needs,	and	building	the	capacity	of	
charters	and	other	schools	of	choice	to	serve	students	
with	disabilities.	In	addition,	policymakers	should	seek	
out	applications	from	charter	school	operators—such	as	
the	acclaimed	St.	Coletta	school	for	students	with	severe	
disabilities	in	Washington,	D.C.—whose	specific	mission	is	
to	serve	children	with	disabilities.
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